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A Reevaluation of the Role of Family in Immigrants’ Labor Market Activity: 
Evidence from a Comparison of Single and Married Immigrants
*
 
Previous papers tested the validity of the Family Investment Hypothesis (FIH) among 
immigrants by comparing the labor market outcomes of immigrant couples and native or 
mixed couples. Here we propose an alternative test for the FIH which is based on a 
comparison between married and single immigrants. The logic underlying this alternative 
method states that if credit constraints are binding, then only married immigrants can cross-
finance their investment within the family. In order to overcome potential selection bias that 
would arise if unobserved characteristics that affect the marital status of the individual also 
affect his/her labor market outcomes, we construct a difference-in-differences estimator that 
exploits variation in the labor market outcomes of married and single natives. Implementation 
of this method using US and Israeli data leads to a rejection of the FIH in both countries. 
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Introduction 
According to the Family Investment Hypothesis (FIH), credit-constrained immigrant families 
adopt a household strategy upon arrival in order to finance the acquisition of human capital. 
According to this strategy, one spouse invests in host-country-specific human capital while the 
other enters the labor market in order to finance their current consumption. Any evidence that the 
secondary worker in the family works longer hours and foregoes investment in human capital by 
initially taking better-paying but “dead-end” jobs in comparison to her/his native counterpart, is 
taken as support for the hypothesis and for the existence of binding liquidity constraints.  
Several papers have attempted to examine the FIH in the US.
1 Duleep and Sanders (1993) 
and McPherson and Stewart (1989) used a single cross-section and found their results to be 
consistent with the FIH. Duleep and Dowhan (2002) used longitudinal data while Blau et al. 
(2003) used repeated cross-sections and both concluded that in contrast to the family investment 
model, both spouses in an immigrant family invest primarily in their own human capital rather 
than their spouse’s. These papers tested the validity of the FIH based on a comparison between 
native and immigrant couples.
2 However, this type of comparison may be problematic since the 
behavior of immigrants may differ from that of natives for reasons other than binding liquidity 
constraints, such as differences in work habits, culture and the self-selection of immigrants.  
This paper offers an alternative methodology and interpretation to the conventional method 
for testing the FIH which is based on a more appealing comparison between married and single 
immigrants. The motivation for this approach stems from the fact that if indeed immigrants face 
binding liquidity constraints, then a single immigrant may not have enough resources to finance his 
investment in local human capital, while a married immigrant has access to family resources (i.e. 
his spouse’s income). However, if individuals are self-selected into marriage with respect to 
unobserved characteristics and these unobservables affect labor outcomes, then the direct 
comparison between married and single immigrants may lead to a specious conclusion regarding 
the validity of the FIH. To control for this potential selection bias, we exploit the variation in the 
labor supply and wages of married and single natives, who are not expected to face binding 
                                                 
1 There is an extensive literature that attempts to empirically test the FIH in other countries as well. For example, 
Beach and Worswick (1993), Worswick (1996, 1999) and Baker and Benjamin (1997) in Canada and Cobb-Clark and 
Crossley (2004) in Australia. 
2 Some papers also included mixed couples, i.e. couples with one immigrant spouse and one native spouse, in their 
samples. 
  2liquidity constraints, in order to construct a difference-in-differences (hereafter: Dif-in-Dif) 
estimator for the evaluation of the FIH. 
Formally, denote by   and   the outcomes (i.e. labor supply or wage) for a married male 
immigrant and a single male immigrant, respectively, and by   and   the outcomes of a 
married male native and a single male native, respectively. Our Dif-in-Dif estimator is therefore 
defined as:  which is equivalent to  - . The estimator 
used in previous papers was   (hereafter referred to as the conventional estimator). Thus, 
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3
We use the new estimator to test the FIH in the US and Israel. For Israel, we focused only on 
immigrants from the Former Soviet Union (FSU).
4 Most of these immigrants have a college 
education and had worked in their source country in highly-skilled occupations. Their transition 
from a communist regime to a developed economy required an adjustment of their imported skills 
to the requirements of the Israeli labor market. Thus, the use of the Israeli data is an attempt to test 
the FIH among highly-skilled immigrants who are more likely to invest in human capital 
appropriate to the new country.   
Using the 1980 and 1990 US censuses, we found that   for both males and 
females. Specifically, after about five years in the US, single immigrants (both male and female) 
earn more than comparable single natives. Regarding labor supply, a single male immigrant 
initially works less than a comparable native but after about eight years he is working more, while 
a single female immigrant always works less than her native counterpart. We found that 
 for both males and females in Israel as well, such that single male and female 
natives initially earn more than comparable single immigrants but that this pattern is reversed after 
about 18 years for males and 23 years for females. The labor supply pattern for single immigrants 
in Israel is quite similar to that for single male immigrants in the US, such that upon arrival in 
Israel single immigrants (both male and female) work less than their native counterparts but after 
about eight years in the country the situation is reversed.  










  Which predictions of the Dif-in-Dif approach would be consistent with the FIH? Under the 
assumption that the primary worker is the husband, we would expect that if we control for the 
                                                 
3 Identical estimators are constructed for females. 
4 In the US we do not restrict ourselves to specific source countries. 
  3hours/wage gap between married and single native males, then an immigrant husband would 
initially work (and earn) less but will experience a higher growth rate in hours and wage than a 
single male immigrant. In addition, if we control for the hours/wage gap between married and 
single female natives, then an immigrant wife would initially work (and earn) more than a single 
female immigrant, but her wage growth will be lower.
5 Alternatively, recalling that our estimator 
can also be written as  - , we would expect that the difference in the growth in 
work hours and wages between immigrant and native husbands will be higher than that between 
single male immigrants and single male natives, while the difference in growth in work hours and 
wages between immigrant and native wives will be lower than that between single female 
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To illustrate the difference between the conventional estimator and Dif-in-Dif, note that in 
the conventional evaluation of the FIH the observation that the primary worker (male) in the 
family initially works fewer hours but eventually overtakes his native counterpart is viewed as 
support for the FIH. However, in our strategy the same pattern can be viewed as contradicting the 
hypothesis if the gap in hours between single male immigrants and single  male natives 
(i.e. ) grows at a faster rate than that between married male immigrants and married male 
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Using the Dif-in-Dif approach, which controls for the difference between married and single 
natives, we find that among immigrants to the US, both male and female married immigrants 
initially earn less than their single immigrant counterparts, but that after about 9-10 years they in 
fact earn more. These positive wage assimilation profiles for married immigrants (relative to single 
immigrants) contradict the FIH and suggest that neither married female immigrants nor married 
male immigrants take "dead-end" jobs in the US.  
With regard to labor supply, we find that both single and married male immigrants in the US 
have positive work hours assimilation profiles. However, the profile for single male immigrants in 
comparison to single male natives is steeper than that of married male immigrants in comparison to 
married male natives. These patterns indicate that if we control for the single-married gap among 
male natives, then married male immigrants always work less than single male immigrants. In 
other words, married male immigrants in the US indeed eventually overtake married male natives 
(as was previously reported in Blau et al., 2003), but for reasons other than the financing of their 
investment by their wives.  
                                                 
5 The patterns are reversed if the wife is the primary worker and the husband is the secondary worker. 
  4For females, we find that both single and married immigrants work less than their native 
counterparts, such that the Dif-in-Dif work hours estimator is negative upon arrival, but has a 
positive slope. This finding contradicts the FIH and implies that immigrant wives do not work 
more hours upon arrival (in comparison to single female immigrants) in order to finance their 
husbands' investment.  
For Israel, if we control for the work hours gap between married and single female natives, 
immigrant wives work less hours upon arrival than single female immigrants, but within three 
years this is reversed. This pattern implies that immigrant wives do not work more hours upon 
arrival in order to finance their husbands’ investment. The Dif-in-Dif work hours estimator for 
males in Israel has a similar trend but a lower magnitude than for females. In addition, it was found 
that the wages of immigrant husbands (wives) do not converge to that of native- Israeli husbands 
(wives). However, the wages of both male and female single immigrants overtake those of their 
single native counterparts. Thus, if we control for the wage gap between married and single 
natives, then both immigrant wives and immigrant husbands earn less than their single immigrant 
counterparts, regardless of how long they have been in Israel. This result suggests that immigrant 




We examine the labor market assimilation patterns of married and single immigrants in the US 
using a pooled sample of native couples, immigrant couples, single natives and single immigrants.
6 
The entire 5% Public Use Samples of the 1980 and 1990 Censuses are used to construct the 
immigrant samples (couples and singles) while the 1% Public Use Samples of the 1980 and 1990 
Censuses are used to construct the samples of single natives and couples in which both spouses are 
natives.
7
As pointed out in Blau et al. (2003), the US Census is particularly suitable for analyzing 
immigrant outcomes due to its large sample size and its information on race and ethnicity, country 
of origin and year of immigration (grouped).  
  In order to compare the Dif-of-Dif results to those of the conventional approach, we 
adopted the sample restrictions suggested by Blau et al. (2003) and use similar specifications as 
much as possible. Thus, we restrict the samples of native and immigrant couples to those in which 
                                                 
6 We did not include “mixed couples” in the sample, i.e. those with one immigrant spouse and one native spouse. 
7 We use the 5% censuses to construct the sample of (married and single) immigrants in order to increase the number 
of observations on immigrants. Observations are unweighted throughout the analysis. 
  5both spouses are aged 16-64 and exclude the self-employed and individuals with positive but 
implausible values for their hourly wages (in our case, less than $1 or greater than $250 in fixed 
2000 dollars using the Personal Consumption Expenditures deflator). We exclude natives born 
abroad, at sea or in US territories, individuals who are in the military and those with allocated 
wage and salary income. Note that for married couples, if one spouse did not meet the sample 
inclusion restrictions, then both were excluded. The samples of single natives and immigrants are 
based on the same inclusion restrictions as the samples of couples, with the exception that we 
restrict the age of singles to 21-64 and exclude singles that are classified in the census as children 
in relation to the head of the household. 
 
Israel 
The analysis for Israel is based on repeated cross-section data from the matched Israeli Labor 
Force Survey (LFS) and Income Survey (IS) for the years 1991-2004.
8 The LFS and IS are annual 
surveys conducted by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. An individual is classified as a native 
Israeli if he was born in Israel and as an immigrant if he was born in the FSU. Hence, not all 
immigrants in Israel were included in the analysis. The sample restriction rules in this case are 
similar to those used for the US data. In other words, we include only native and immigrant 
couples in which both spouses are aged 16-64 while single natives and immigrants are restricted to 
ages 21-64. 
 
The Labor Supply and Wage Assimilation of Single and Married Immigrants in the US and 
Israel 
In order to analyze labor supply, we estimate the following equation separately for females and 
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where Y is annual hours worked in the previous year (regular weekly number of hours multiplied 
by weeks worked, including individuals who worked at home) for individual i in year t,   is a set 
of immigrant cohort-of-arrival effects and YSM is years since migration for immigrants (and equals 
i C
                                                 
8 The matched LFS and IS for 1994 was not made available to us. 
  60 for natives). The sum of an individual i’s cohort dummies in equation (1) is identical to the 
immigrant dummy variable, immig, which therefore is not included separately in (1). To further 
explore differences between single and married individuals (both natives and immigrants), 
Equation (1) includes a dummy for married individuals (Married) and interaction terms between 
this dummy and the following variables: 1) years since migration (YSM), 2) years since migration 
squared (YSM
2), 3) a dummy for immigrants (Immig), 4) age (Age), 5) age squared (Age
2), 6) a 
dummy for the presence of children aged 0-5 (child_a) and 7) number of children (child_b). We 
allow the effect of the presence of young children and the number of children to differ between 
immigrants and natives by including interaction terms of the immigrant dummy, immig, with 
child_a and child_b.  is the set of the spouse’s cohort-of-arrival effects and   is the 





9 The repeated cross-sections and the assumption of a common time 
effect for immigrants and natives, Kt, makes it possible to separately identify immigrant cohort and 
assimilation effects (Borjas, 1985). Finally, X is a vector of control variables which will be 
discussed below and u is an error term.  
The logged wage equations have a similar form as (1). Real wages for the US were defined 
as the previous year’s wage and salary income divided by weeks worked and multiplied by the 
regular weekly work hours and expressed in dollars and 2000 prices, while the real wage in Israel 
was expressed in NIS and 1997 prices.  
 
Specific Parameterization for the US 
The US data was taken from two censuses, such that t=1980, 1990.  
The cohort-of-arrival dummy variables (whose coefficients are γs) were defined so as to include 
every possible arrival cohort as coded in the Census: 1987-90, 1985-86, 1982-84, 1980-81, 1975-
79, 1970-74, 1965-69, 1960-64, 1950-59 and pre-1950.
10  
The X vector for the US includes quadratics in age for both husband and wife, dummies for years 
of schooling for both husband and wife, extent of fluency in English (speaks English “well,” 
“poorly” or “not at all”, with native English speakers as the omitted category), number of children, 
a dummy variable for the presence of children less than six years old, three race/ethnicity dummy 
                                                 
9 As mentioned above, the sum of own-cohort dummies is equal to an immigrant dummy. However, since our sample 
includes only immigrant couples in which both spouses are immigrants and in equation (1) we include an interaction 
term between Immig and Married, one of the spouse’s cohort dummies had to be dropped. 
10 Following Borjas (1995), we calculated years since migration by evaluating the period-of-immigration variables at 
their midpoints and used YSM=40 years in 1990 and YSM=30 years in 1980 for the open-ended category (i.e. before 
1950). 
  7variables (black, other nonwhite and white), a dummy for Hispanic origin and a metropolitan area 
dummy variable.
11 The reference group according to this specification is black single natives with 
1-8 years of schooling. 
 
Specific Parameterization for Israel 
The Israeli data were taken from the matched LFS and IS for 1991-2004 such that t=1991-1993 
and 1995-2004. The cohort dummies for FSU immigrants were 2002, 2001, 2000, 1999, 1998, 
1997, 1996, 1995, 1994, 1993, 1992, 1991, 1990, 1980-1989, 1970-1979, 1960-1969, 1950-1959 
and pre-1950. The X vector for Israel includes quadratics in age for both husband and wife, 
dummies for years of schooling for both husband and wife, number of children and a dummy for 
the presence of children less than six years old. The reference group is single Israeli natives with 1-
8 years of schooling. 
Results for the US 
Table 1a presents the basic regression results for annual work hours and wages using reduced form 
models for the US. Consider first the results for the labor supply equation for females. The results 
indicate that the annual work hours of a single female immigrant increase during her first nine 
years in the US and subsequently decline. The single female immigrant’s own-cohort effects are 
positive if she arrived before 1974 and negative otherwise. For a married female immigrant, the 
effect of her time in the US (in comparison to a married native) equals the sum of the coefficients 
of  YSM, YSM
2, Married*YSM and Married*YSM
2,  which increases for the first 20.5 years. 
However, the labor supply of an immigrant wife decreases with her husband’s time in the US. The 
own-cohort effect for an immigrant wife is equal to the sum of the coefficients of the cohort 
dummy and the Married*Immig variable and thus is always negative. Relative to the omitted 
husband cohort (87-90), the husband’s cohort effect on his wife's labor supply is negative if he 
arrived before 1964 and positive otherwise. 
For males, the annual work hours of a single male immigrant increase during his first 31 
years in the US and his own-cohort effect is negative with the exception of the 1985-86 cohort. 
The own-YSM effect for an immigrant husband (YSM, YSM
2, Married*YSM and Married*YSM
2) 
also increases during his first 30 years in the US and his own-cohort effect is always positive (the 
sum of the coefficients of the cohort dummy and Married*Immig). The effect of an immigrant 
wife’s time in the US on her husband’s labor supply is negative, while the impact of her cohort on 
his labor supply is positive, relative to the omitted category of wives who arrived in 1987-90.  
                                                 
11 We were not able to use regional dummies as in Blau et al. (2003). 
  8The net effects of YSM and cohort on the work hours assimilation profiles of married 
immigrants relative to married natives and of single immigrants relative to single natives are 
presented in Table 1b for males and females. The example is based on immigrants (single and 
married) who arrived between 1975 and 1979 with no children. Relative to single female natives 
with similar characteristics, we find that immigrant females supply 100.75 fewer work hours upon 
arrival and tend to supply less work hours as time in the US increases, while immigrant wives 
supply 346.5 (i.e. -269.04–100.75+23.28) fewer hours upon arrival than married native females 
with similar characteristics and their labor supply increases over time. 
Figure 1a presents the work hours assimilation profiles of female immigrants as they 
appear in Table 1b. The assimilation effects for single female immigrants imply a concave annual 
work hours profile relative to comparable single natives, such that the gap at first declines and only 
increases after nine years in the US. The assimilation effects for married female immigrants imply 
increasing annual work hours relative to comparable married natives. However, immigrant wives 
do not overtake native wives. The resulting Dif-in-Dif work hours profile for females is presented 
in Figure 1c.This profile increases with time in the US and implies that if we control for the work 
hours gap between married and single female natives, then married female immigrants supply less 
work hours upon arrival than single female immigrants; however, after somewhat less than 18 
years in the US, married female immigrants overtake single female immigrants. This pattern 
contradicts the FIH and may indicate that immigrant wives invest in their own human capital upon 
arrival rather than invest in their husbands' human capital. 
For males, we find that single immigrants supply 226.1 fewer work hours upon arrival 
relative to US single natives with similar characteristics, while immigrant husbands supply 267 
fewer hours than their native counterparts.  As illustrated in Figure 1b, the assimilation effects for 
single males imply that their annual work hours relative to comparable single male natives increase 
with time in the US and that they overtake single natives after eight years. The assimilation effects 
for married males also imply increasing annual work hours relative to comparable married natives 
and that they overtake native husbands after about 11 years.  
Using the Dif-in-Dif approach for males’ work hours (Figure 1c), we obtain that married 
male immigrants supply 40 fewer work hours upon arrival than single male immigrants and in 
general this gap grows (in absolute terms) with time in the US. In other words, if we control for the 
work hours gap between married and single male natives, then single male immigrants always 
supply more work hours than comparable married male immigrants, which contradicts the FIH.  
  9It is important to note at this point that when using the conventional method to test the FIH 
the observation that an immigrant husband initially works fewer hours but eventually overtakes his 
married native counterpart is viewed as support for the FIH. However, according to our Dif-in-Dif 
strategy this observation alone can not provide a support to the hypothesis and since the work 
hours gap between immigrant and native single males grows at a faster pace over time than the gap 
between  married male immigrants and natives the FIH is rejected. Hence, married male 
immigrants in the US indeed eventually work more hours in comparison to married male natives 
(as was previously reported in Blau et al., 2003), but not because their wives financed their 
investment in human capital.  
With respect to wages, Table 1a indicates that the wage assimilation profiles are positive 
for immigrant husbands and wives and for single male and female immigrants. The evaluation of 
these results for the 1975-79 cohort is presented in Table 1c and in Figure 1d for females and in 
Figure 1e for males. Both married and single female immigrants earn less than their native female 
counterparts upon arrival in the US, but within somewhat less than five years single female 
immigrants earn more than single female natives and after about nine years immigrant wives earn 
more than comparable native wives (Figure 1d). For males (see Figure 1e), we find that single 
immigrants initially earn 4% more than single natives, while immigrant husbands earn about 6.3% 
less than native husbands. However, both single and immigrant husbands have positive wage 
assimilation profiles, such that after 20 years in the US single male immigrants earn about 11% 
more than single male natives and immigrant husbands earn 20% more than their native 
counterparts. 
The Dif-in-Dif wage estimator for males and females is presented in Figure 1f and shows 
that if we control for the wage gap between married and single natives, both immigrant wives and 
husbands start with lower wages than their single immigrant counterparts, but overtake them in 
about 9-10 years. In other words, immigrant husbands experience higher wage growth than single 
male immigrants and similarly immigrant wives experience higher wage growth than single female 
immigrants. The observation that immigrant wives experience positive wage growth in comparison 
to single female immigrants indicates that immigrant wives in the US do not take "dead-end" jobs 
to finance their husbands' investment, but rather invest in their own human capital.  
 
Results: Israel 
The regressions results for annual work hours and wages in Israel are presented in Table 2a. The 
results show that the annual work hours of a single female immigrant from the FSU increase with 
  10her time in Israel up to 33 years. Almost all the own-cohort effects are negative and significant 
relative to the omitted group of 2003-2004.
12 The change in the labor supply of a married female 
immigrant with respect to her time in Israel is the sum of the coefficients of YSM, YSM
2, 
Married*YSM and Married *YSM
2, which increases for the first 29 years. The labor supply of an 
immigrant wife also increases with her husband’s time in Israel. The own-cohort effect for an 
immigrant wife is equal to the sum of the coefficients of her cohort dummy and the 
Married*Immig variable, implying that it is always negative, while her husband’s cohort effect is 
usually positive, though not always significant relative to the omitted cohort of 2003-2004. 
  For male immigrants in Israel, the results indicate that the labor supply of a single 
immigrant increases during his first 44 years in Israel, while the labor supply of a married 
immigrant increases with his own time in Israel for the first 39 years and also with his wife's time 
in Israel. The own-cohort effects for male FSU immigrants in Israel who arrived in the waves of 
immigration during the period 1950-1989 and in the early 1990s are negative and significant 
relative to the omitted category (2003-2004), while for later periods they switch signs and are 
usually not significant. 
The work hours assimilation profiles for single and married male (female) immigrants who 
arrived in 1990 and were 30 (28) years old upon arrival in Israel are shown in Table 2b. For 
females, the results show that both married and single immigrants have positive work hours 
assimilation profiles relative to their native female counterparts. Upon arrival, immigrant wives 
supply 356 less hours than comparable native wives, but after five years the situation is reversed, 
while single female immigrants initially work 216 hours less than comparable single female 
natives but after 10 years overtake them (see also Figure 2a).  
The resulting work hours Dif-in-Dif estimator for females is presented in Figure 2c. If we 
control for the work hours gap between married and single female natives, we obtain that 
immigrant wives supply 140 less work hours than comparable single female immigrants. However, 
this gap is closed after about three years and after twenty years in Israel immigrant wives work 
approximately 460 hours more than single immigrants. This pattern implies that immigrant wives 
do not work more hours upon arrival to finance their husbands’ investment in human capital. 
For males, we also find that both married and single immigrants have positive work hours 
assimilation profiles relative to their native male counterparts (Table 2a and Figure 2b). Upon 
arrival, immigrant husbands supply 566 less work hours than comparable native husbands, but 
                                                 
12 The numbers of immigrants (and consequently the number of observations) for the 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 
cohorts are relatively small and may affect the significance of these variables. 
  11after nine years the situation is reversed. The assimilation hours profile of single male immigrants 
is almost identical to that of single female immigrants. Single male immigrants initially work 188 
hours less than comparable single male natives but after about nine years the situation is reversed. 
If we use the Dif-in-Dif work hours estimator for males and thus control for the work hours 
gap between married and single native males, then the assimilation profile of immigrant husbands 
relative to comparable single male immigrants is positive and concave (Figure 2c). Immigrant 
husbands supply 378 less hours than comparable single male immigrants upon arrival, though 
within 20 years in Israel they are supplying 150 hours more. Although this result may be consistent 
with the FIH, as mentioned above, the Dif-in-Dif work hours profile of females does not support 
the hypothesis.  
The wage results for males and females in Israel are presented in Table 2a and are 
illustrated for the 1990 cohort in Table 2c. The illustration is also presented for females in Figure 
2d and for males in Figure 2e. Interestingly, we find that although the wage assimilation profile of 
husbands and wives in immigrant families is positive relative to their native counterparts, the 
wages of immigrant husbands (wives) do not converge to those of native husbands (wives). 
However, we find that single female immigrants overtake single female natives after 23 years in 
Israel and single male immigrants overtake single male natives after 18 years. 
Figure 2f presents the Dif-in-Dif wage profile for females and males in Israel, which shows 
that when controlling for the wage gap between married and single natives, both immigrant wives 
and immigrant husbands earn less than their single immigrant counterparts, regardless of time in 
Israel. This result suggests that immigrant wives in Israel do not finance their husbands' investment 
in human capital (or vise versa) and thus contradicts the FIH.  
 
Conclusions 
The paper offers an alternative method for testing the Family Investment Hypothesis. The 
estimation is based on comparing the labor supply and wage patterns of married and single 
immigrants. To account for the possible self-selection to marry as a result of unobserved 
characteristics that may also affect labor outcomes, we exploited the variation in the labor supply 
and wages of married and single natives and constructed a difference in differences (Dif-in-Dif) 
estimator in order to test the FIH.  
The estimation was carried out using micro data for the US and Israel. The use of the 
Israeli data on immigrants from the Former Soviet Union adds additional novel aspect to the 
  12analysis since it allows us to test the FIH among highly-skilled immigrants, for whom the need to 
invest in local human capital is crucial.  
According to the results for both countries, the FIH is to be rejected. By controlling for the 
labor supply gap between married and single female natives, it was shown that immigrant wives in 
the US and in Israel work less than single female immigrants upon arrival, but eventually overtake 
them. In addition, we find that by controlling for the wage gap between married and single female 
natives, immigrant wives in the US and in Israel earn less than single female immigrants upon 
arrival; while according to the FIH they should have earned more in order to finance the family 
current consumption.  
Finally, the paper demonstrates that the conventional testing of the FIH based on a 
comparison between married immigrants and married natives can be misleading. We show that 
although immigrant husbands in the US indeed overtake native husbands in labor supply, single 
male immigrants also overtake single male natives and by an even greater percentage.  
 Thus, the positive work hours assimilation of immigrant husbands cannot be attributed to the 
financial support of their wives, but is apparently due to other factors. Exploring these factors 
awaits further empirical investigation.  
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Ysm_f 5.30249  1.074562  -17.3908 1.159352 0.003737 0.00112 0.002947 0.001072
Ysm
2_f -0.30545  0.027641  0.227669 0.028317 2.47E-05 3.05E-05 1.69E-05 2.76E-05
Ysm_m -4.31294  1.173328  28.78018 0.946155 0.001765 0.001234 0.001609 0.000946
Ysm
2_m 0.125163  0.025945  -0.45686 0.026247 -6.8E-05 2.86E-05 8.97E-05 2.72E-05
Married 2281.753  16.23594  1202.788 15.83343 0.376473 0.018187 -0.09559 0.016296
Married*immig -269.045  11.217 -207.51 9.744088 -0.07863 0.012082 -0.08965 0.009033
Married*Ysm 22.39715  1.054567  18.80833 1.002803 0.008164 0.001126 0.010507 0.000971
Married*Ysm
2   -0.37047  0.024723  -0.32994 0.023841 -0.00011 2.81E-05 -0.00018 2.51E-05
im50_f 417.2411  30.71052  329.7701 35.10657 -0.12617 0.031531 -0.14912 0.03422
im5059_f 95.19205  18.81836  384.7057 20.49345 -0.05934 0.018511 -0.04901 0.019047
im6064_f 57.94284  15.38421  364.2234 16.5663 -0.02368 0.01516 -0.03709 0.015182
im6569_f 35.53389  12.97162  325.0767 13.8236 0.006074 0.013072 -0.0355 0.012685
im7074_f 15.29503  10.89743  276.7168 11.46749 0.008235 0.011207 -0.02685 0.010495
im7579_f -100.757  8.354597  166.6367 9.174648 -0.01897 0.008914 -0.02851 0.00842
im8081_f -71.2592  10.16169  112.6677 10.89608 -0.03574 0.010282 -0.04443 0.009708
im8284_f -105.194  9.701989  88.42153 10.58828 -0.04094 0.009736 -0.04115 0.00934
im8586_f -176.767  9.271906  41.16765 10.39708 -0.05978 0.0093 -0.0318 0.00909
im8790_f  -471.238 7.895697       -0.09466 0.008109      
im50_m -114.25  33.99992  -258.094 28.65291 0.030725 0.035499 -0.11311 0.028268
im5059_m -83.57  21.92537  -419.829 16.68214 -0.02543 0.022305 -0.03925 0.015981
im6064_m -65.4375  18.36593  -370.191 13.46419 -0.02281 0.01878 0.014644 0.012866
im6569_m 10.14554  15.6951  -329.555 11.32961 -0.00911 0.016257 0.043747 0.011037
im7074_m 27.90518  13.32865  -232.813 9.476387 0.00027 0.014032 0.057564 0.009328
im7579_m 23.28002  11.14634  -226.103 7.02837 0.001935 0.012093 0.040101 0.007263
im8081_m 35.60013  12.25543  -100.645 9.012312 -0.01457 0.013028 0.031029 0.008574
im8284_m 16.97814  12.04072  -21.1462 8.50369 -0.0139 0.012814 0.038739 0.008002
im8586_m 31.51431  12.1391  29.34108 7.890935 -0.00493 0.013083 0.03282 0.007366
im8790_m     -280.968 6.741369   0.003639 0.006569
a   _m indicates male and _f indicates female. 
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Table 1b: Differences in work hours between immigrants and natives by marital status and 
gender for the US (1975-79 cohort) 
  Net Net  Difference between immigrants and natives evaluated at YSM = 
Group  YSM YSM
2 0  5 10 15 20 25 30 
(1) Difference:  
Married Females –  
Immigrant vs, Native  23.3
a
-
0.550  -346.5  -243.35 -167.73 -119.64  -99.09 -106.07 -140.60 
              
(2) Difference: 
Single Females –  
Immigrant vs. Native   5.3 
-
0.305  -100.75  -81.88  -78.27  -89.94 -116.88 -159.10 -216.58 
              
Females 
Dif-in-Dif 
(1)-(2)              
     -245.75 -161.47  -89.46 -29.7 17.79 53.03 75.98 
(3) Difference: 
Married Males –
Immigrant vs. Native   30.2
a
-
0.559  -267  -129.96 -20.91  60.18 113.32 138.50 135.73 
              
(4) Difference:  
Single Males – 
Immigrant vs. Native   28.7 
-
0.456  -226.1  -93.62  16.01 102.80 166.75 207.86 226.12 
              
Males 
Dif-in-Dif 
(3)-(4)      -40.9  -36.34 -36.92 -42.62 -53.43 -69.36 -90.39 
Notes: Based on regression results reported in Table 1a. 
a Net YSM equals the sum of the coefficients of YSM_f, YSM_m and Married*YSM. 
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Table 1c:  Differences in logged wages between immigrants and natives by marital status and 
gender for the US (1975-79 cohort) 
  Net Net  Difference between immigrants and natives evaluated at YSM = 
Group  YSM YSM







a -0.00015 -0.0976 -0.0310 0.0261 0.0758 0.1181  0.1530 0.1804






Native   0.0037 2.47*10
-5 -0.0189 0.0003 0.0261 0.0426 0.0656 0.0899 0.1154
      
Females 
Dif-in-Dif 
(1)-(2)     -0.0787 -0.0313 0 0.0332 0.0525  0.0631 0.065






Native   0.0151
a -7.3*10
-5 -0.1181 -0.0046 0.0651 0.1311 0.1934 0.2520 0.3068






Native   0.0016 8.97*10
-5 -0.0285 0.0503 0.0651 0.0844 0.1081 0.1363 0.1691
      
Males 
Dif-in-Dif 
(3)-(4)     -0.0896 -0.0549 0 0.0467 0.0853  0.1157 0.1377
      
Notes: Based on regression results reported in Table 1a. 
a Net YSM equals the sum of the coefficients of YSM_f, YSM_m and Married*YSM 
  16Table 2a: Work Hours and Wage Regressions for Israel 
Independent 
Variable
a Annual hours  Wage 
   female Male female male   









Ysm_f 25.75094  6.252143  32.13046 10.15153 0.02262 0.00503 0.012669 0.006376
Ysm
2_f -0.38822  0.11472  -0.80148 0.162853 -0.00038 9.98E-05 -0.00035 0.000138
Ysm_m 20.50237  8.488665  23.0483 6.390822 0.02323 0.008746 0.020721 0.004013
Ysm
2_m -0.50002  0.120863  -0.26453 0.107101 -0.00061 0.000208 -0.00023 6.19E-05
Married -268.449  103.2678  144.6366 125.6159 -0.19134 0.095006 -0.48677 0.094298
married*immig -404.417  339.7467  -868.792 334.5371 -0.49387 0.284492 -0.53429 0.204599
married*Ysm  31.18282 8.069309 14.75183 9.018398 -5.5E-05 0.007724 0.013581 0.00521
married*Ysm
2   -0.59214  0.144298  -0.22075 0.147534 0.000036 0.000179 -0.00014 9.4E-05
im_f49 34.98233  217.1725  1549.022 527.2796 0.100586 0.163177 0.761855 0.357762
im_f59 -283.713  172.4879  954.3164 438.0796 -0.11146 0.127835 0.338301 0.275664
im_f69 -294.457  139.6445  573.6423 404.2893 -0.25795 0.102588 0.196613 0.246485
im_f79 -405.109  105.7892  408.727 357.5763 -0.30581 0.079925 0.027551 0.219095
im_f89 -321.118  78.27584  506.565 350.0322 -0.24523 0.05984 0.038945 0.213698
im_f90 -216.74  59.03202  490.2956 340.7518 -0.32166 0.046229 -0.09439 0.208643
im_f91 -211.562  57.62368  403.5436 340.5889 -0.39838 0.045213 -0.07857 0.208393
im_f92 -162.694  66.69557  382.0504 343.6512 -0.37667 0.050303 -0.07238 0.209806
im_f93 -155.831  70.84341  477.0831 344.4266 -0.43865 0.052575 0.003691 0.210315
im_f94 -171.208  64.58447  324.0196 343.7514 -0.37008 0.047298 -0.06393 0.209831
im_f95 -212.587  68.14863  469.8602 342.9605 -0.34997 0.050435 -0.15941 0.209804
im_f96 -195.453  70.58081  383.9537 345.4827 -0.4124 0.05273 -0.08864 0.210896
im_f97 -21.225  74.1157  308.7741 348.1967 -0.37772 0.052298 -0.09833 0.212345
im_f98 -211.026  89.99068  384.7223 350.6336 -0.51327 0.069096 -0.08691 0.212782
im_f99 48.85163  88.89071  444.8791 353.1134 -0.40518 0.060491 -0.03017 0.21486
im_f100 71.97309  107.6158  556.2577 364.5566 -0.40451 0.082557 0.055373 0.22442
im_f101 -145.359  122.2069  147.8725 378.256 -0.45159 0.091617 0.042951 0.232299
im_f102 206.3338  201.9658  1121.202 415.786 -0.40384 0.150026 0.173218 0.246811
im_m49 858.8613  465.419  -272.076 243.4191 0.962793 0.402609 -0.17773 0.168121
im_m59 139.8661  414.0052  -687.136 194.6611 0.337703 0.343018 -0.45474 0.125384
im_m69 216.1996  387.7311  -754.146 152.0955 0.161196 0.314777 -0.51059 0.09636
im_m79 86.50895  358.7532  -567.885 112.1981 0.201788 0.297295 -0.37392 0.072413
im_m89 308.7341  352.1894  -287.919 85.60517 0.071687 0.292863 -0.34471 0.054239
im_m90 264.8444  345.2939  -188.074 62.23629 0.025007 0.288667 -0.29881 0.039735
im_m91 206.5277  345.1064  -113.106 60.90508 0.042049 0.288493 -0.35105 0.038077
im_m92 295.9543  347.4124  -120.355 71.76784 -0.00811 0.289666 -0.33111 0.043339
im_m93 314.7047  348.0145  -155.125 73.46017 0.049995 0.289839 -0.38491 0.044939
im_m94 345.8384  347.2085  8.199701 72.5072 0.056021 0.289171 -0.31484 0.043262
im_m95 334.1152  347.8267  -90.1841 73.7943 0.02929 0.289827 -0.24527 0.044143
im_m96 320.8884  348.9754  -59.4606 81.48393 0.111096 0.29053 -0.31747 0.049353
im_m97 74.73281  350.1775  52.34888 87.80086 0.108974 0.291005 -0.25342 0.052992
im_m98 398.5705  354.9246  -72.6088 103.0534 0.273469 0.294411 -0.23351 0.063528
im_m99 -13.1828  353.8811  -32.5738 104.4228 0.111138 0.292836 -0.33856 0.062615
im_m100 -84.5437  361.7709  -329.493 134.6544 0.185378 0.300601 -0.47067 0.090783
im_m101 140.9658  372.1562  160.3759 164.259 0.315476 0.306267 -0.2615 0.104517
im_m102 -37.7414  430.1635  -454.246 211.2653 0.342365 0.349194 -0.52644 0.146787
a  _m indicates male and _f indicates female. 
  17Table 2b: Differences in work hours between immigrants and natives by marital status and 
gender in Israel (1990 cohort) 
  Net Net  Difference between immigrants and natives evaluated at YSM = 
Group  YSM YSM
2 0  5 10 15 20 25 30 





a -1.48  -356  -6.14 270.00 472.14 600.25 654.34 634.42 





Native   25.75  -0.39  -216.74 -97.69  1.94  82.17 142.98 184.39 206.38 
            
Females 
Dif-in-Dif 
(1)-(2)      -139.26  91.55 268.06 389.97 457.27 469.95 428.04 





Native   69.93
a -1.29  -566  -249.08  4.06 192.86 317.33 377.47 373.26 
            
(4) Difference: 
Single Males – 
Immigrant vs. 
Native   23.05  -0.26      -188.07  -79.44  15.95  98.13  167.07  222.79  265.29 
            
Males 
Dif-in-Dif 
(3)-(4)      -377.93  -169.64 -11.89  94.73 150.26 154.68 107.97 
Notes: Based on regression results reported in Table 2a. 
a Net YSM equals the sum of the coefficients of YSM_f, YSM_m and Married*YSM 
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Table 2c: Differences in logged wages between immigrants and natives in Israel by marital 
status and gender (1990 cohort) 
  Net Net  Difference between immigrants and natives evaluated at YSM = 
Group  YSM YSM
2 0  5 10 15 20 25 30 




Native  0.0458  -0.00095  -0.7904 -0.5854 -0.4280 -0.3184 -0.2566 -0.2425 -0.2762 





Native   0.0226  -0.0004  -0.3216 -0.2180 -0.1332 -0.0674 -0.0204  0.0075  0.0166 
             
Females 
Dif-in-Dif 
(1)-(2)      -0.4688 -0.3674 -0.2948  -0.251 -0.2362  -0.25 -0.2928 




Native    0.0207  -0.0002  -0.9275 -0.7106 -0.5296 -0.3847 -0.2757 -0.2027 -0.1656 
             
(4) Difference: 
Single Males – 
Immigrant vs. 
Native    0.0469  -0.00072  -0.2988 -0.2010 -0.1147 -0.0401  0.0228  0.0742  0.1140 
             
Males 
Dif-in-Dif 
(3)-(4)      -0.6287 -0.5096 -0.4149 -0.3446 -0.2985 -0.2769 -0.2796 
Notes: Based on regression results reported in Table 2a. 
a Net YSM equals the sum of the coefficients of YSM_f, YSM_m and Married*YSM 
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                        Figure 2d : Wage Assimilation Profiles: Married and Single Females, Israel
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